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Previous studies quantifying the eﬀects of increased taxation during the U.S. Great Depression ﬁnd
that its contribution is small, in accounting for both the downturn in the early 1930s and the slow
recovery after 1934. This paper shows that this conclusion rests critically on the assumption that
the only taxable capital income is business proﬁts. Eﬀects of capital taxation are much larger when
taxes on property, capital stock, excess proﬁts, undistributed proﬁts, and dividends are included
in the analysis. When fed into a general equilibrium model, the increased taxes imply signiﬁcant
declines in investment and equity values and nontrivial declines in gross domestic product (GDP)
and hours of work. Of particular importance during the Great Depression was the dramatic rise in
the eﬀective tax rate on corporate dividends.
∗McGrattan: Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis and University of Minnesota. The views expressed herein
are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or the Federal
Reserve System.1. Introduction
Although there is little consensus about the main contributors to the large contraction of
the ﬁrst half of the 1930s and the slow subsequent recovery, there is some consensus that
ﬁscal policy played only a minor role in the U.S. Great Depression. Empirically, it is argued
that government spending relative to GDP did not rise suﬃciently and that taxes were
ﬁled by very few households and paid by even fewer. (See, for example, Brown (1956) and
the U.S. Statistics of Income.) Theoretically, it is argued that predictions of neoclassical
theory for the impact of increased taxation and spending are too small to matter. (See, in
particular, Cole and Ohanian (1999).)
In this paper, I challenge the view that the impact of all ﬁscal policies during the
1930s was small. Cole and Ohanian (1999) conclude that the impact was small in the
early 1930s because eﬀective tax rates on wages and proﬁts did not change much. In the
latter part of the 1930s, when rates did increase, their estimates show that it accounted
for only a small part of the weak recovery in labor. I show that the overall conclusion
that changes in taxes were too small to matter rests critically on their modeling of capital
taxation, which assumes only taxation of proﬁts.1 The key policy change, however, was
not an increase in the tax rates on corporate incomes (i.e., proﬁts) but rather an increase
in the tax rates on individual incomes, which include corporate dividends. Although
few households paid income taxes, taxpayers that did earned almost all of the income
distributed by corporations and unincorporated businesses.
Like Cole and Ohanian, I use a neoclassical growth model when estimating the impact
of taxes on aggregate activity, but I extend the model they used to include taxes on prop-
erty, capital stock, excess proﬁts, undistributed proﬁts, dividends, and sales in addition to
taxes on proﬁts and wages. I also allow for both tangible and intangible business invest-
ments (as in McGrattan and Prescott 2005) because the U.S. tax code allows businesses
1 This is a standard practice in the business cycle literature. See, for example, Braun (1994) and
McGrattan (1994).
1to reduce taxable corporate proﬁts by expensing intangible investments like advertising
expenditures and research and development (R&D).
The model predicts that higher taxes during the 1930s led to a dramatic decline in
tangible investment, similar to that observed in the United States, with the most important
factor being the rise in the eﬀective tax rate on dividends. The pattern of investment shows
a steep decline in the early part of the decade, followed by some recovery and another steep
decline starting in 1937. The important factor in the latter period is the introduction of the
undistributed proﬁts tax. The model predicts a decline in GDP and hours between 1929
and 1933 that accounts for 40 percent and 47 percent of the actual declines, respectively.
The model’s predicted declines are roughly three times larger for GDP and two times larger
for hours than those predicted by Cole and Ohanian’s (1999) model.
The quantitative results, especially predictions for the early 1930s, do depend on how
household expectations about future income tax rates are modeled. Major changes in
the U.S. tax code were not enacted until the Revenue Act of 1932. However, as early
as February 1930, President Hoover projected large tax increases if members of Congress
enacted their proposed spending projects. Theoretically, anticipated tax increases on future
distributions lead to increases in current distributions and therefore declines in business
investments and equity values. Even with uncertainty about future rates built into the
model, the fact that these tax rate increases are large means that the eﬀects on economic
activity are also large.
Although the results show that tax policy had a major impact on economic activity
in the 1930s, they also show that it could not have been the only factor contributing to the
large contraction and slow recovery of the 1930s. For example, patterns of consumption
in the model do not line up well initially with their analogues in the data. Expectations
of higher future capital tax rates imply a sharp initial increase in distributions of business
incomes, accomplished by lowering both tangible and intangible investments. Increased
2distributions lead counterfactually to increased consumption, which falls only when higher
sales and excise taxes are imposed. Adding New Deal policies as in Cole and Ohanian
(2004) would help in further accounting for the time series patterns in the second half of
the 1930s, but that still leaves open the question of why U.S. consumption fell in the ﬁrst
years of the contraction.2
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I review empirical and theoretical
evidence used in support of the view that ﬁscal policy played only a minor role in the
Great Depression. In Section 3, I redo the exercise of Cole and Ohanian (1999) with a
version of the neoclassical growth model that is more suited to studying ﬁscal policy in the
1930s. I show that the results change dramatically if we include taxes on dividends and
undistributed proﬁts in our analysis. Section 4 concludes.
2. Review of the Literature
In this section, I review some earlier work that has concluded that ﬁscal policy in the 1930s
had only a small eﬀect on economic activity.
A standard reference for those studying ﬁscal policy in the 1930s is Brown (1956) whose
main conclusion is that “ﬁscal policy, then, seems to have been an unsuccessful recovery
device in the ’thirties—not because it did not work, but because it was not tried” (p. 863).3
Brown bases his conclusion on estimates of the impact of ﬁscal policy on aggregate demand,
making assumptions about households’ marginal propensity to consume and save.
As Brown’s conclusion makes clear, the focus of his study is in assessing the positive
2 Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007) use a business cycle accounting exercise during the 1930s and
show that models with frictions manifested primarily as eﬃciency wedges and labor wedges are needed
to account for ﬂuctuations in this period. The inclusion of intangible capital and taxes implies time
variation in these key wedges, but they are not enough; the model still cannot quantitatively account
for all of the ﬂuctuations.
3 In fact, Romer (2009) uses Brown’s evidence when proposing greater ﬁscal stimulus during the 2008–
2009 downturn. Brown (1956) is also a standard reference for those who study the impact of policy in
the 1930s, but abstract from changes in ﬁscal policy. See, for example, Bernanke (1983) and Romer
(1992).
3role of ﬁscal policy in promoting a recovery from the Depression rather than in assessing
its role in the downturn of the early 1930s. The lack of attention paid to the contraction in
the early 1930s is probably due to the fact that major changes in tax policy—which would
have had a negative eﬀect—were not enacted until 1932, and even then, most Americans
were not required to ﬁle tax returns. In Table 1, I show the number of taxable individual
income tax returns (Forms 1040 and 1041) ﬁled in the years 1929 through 1939. To provide
some sense of the magnitudes, I also list the midyear populations for this period. In 1929,
for example, the population was 122 million, but only 2.5 million individual income tax
returns were ﬁled. At that time, the typical household size was 3.3 persons, implying that
only 6.8 percent of the U.S. population were members of tax-paying households. In 1935,
the number of taxpayers had fallen to 2.1 million, while the population had risen to 127
million. In that year, there were 39.5 million households and, therefore, only 5.3 percent
of the population were members of tax-paying households.4
For the current study, the most relevant evidence about the impact of ﬁscal policy
comes from Cole and Ohanian (1999), who compare deterministic steady states of a neo-
classical growth model with government spending and tax rates set at 1929 levels versus
1939 levels. They choose these dates because they are interested in accounting for the
weak recovery in U.S. labor input, which was still well below trend in 1939. They ﬁnd
that the labor input predicted by the model is lower than trend by only 4 percent in 1939
and conclude that “ﬁscal policy shocks account for only about 20 percent of the weak
1934–1939 recovery” (p. 7).
Here, I redo their exercise and reconﬁrm their ﬁnding—although with the full transition—
in order to have a baseline simulation, one that is consistent with conventional wisdom
about the impact of distortionary taxation in the 1930s.
The model Cole and Ohanian (1999) use is a standard growth model with distortionary
4 See Leven, Moulton, and Warburton (1934) and Kneeland (1938).














Table 1. Number of Taxable Individual Income Tax Returns
and Midyear Population, 1929–1930
taxes on wages and proﬁts. Given the initial capital stock k0, the problem for the stand-in





subject to the constraints
ct + xt = rtkt + wtht + κt − ζt (2.2)
kt+1 = [(1 − δ)kt + xt]/(1 + η), (2.3)
where variables are written in per capita terms and Nt = N0(1 + η)t is the population in
t. Capital is paid rent rt, labor is paid wage wt, and per capita transfers are given by κt.
Taxes are summarized by the variable ζt in (2.2). Below, I will specify a speciﬁc formula
for ζt.




where capital letters denote aggregates. The parameter Zt is labor-augmenting technical
change that is assumed to grow at a constant rate, Zt = (1+γ)t. The ﬁrm rents capital and
labor. If proﬁts are maximized, then the rental rates are equal to the marginal products.
The goods market clears, so Nt(ct + xt + gt) = Yt and gt = ζt, where gt is per capita
government spending.
A standard practice in the business cycle literature is to assume that taxes are levied
on capital and labor with excess revenues rebated to households. Capital taxes are modeled
as taxes on proﬁts and thus,
ζt = τpt (rt − δ)kt + τhtwtht, (2.5)
where τpt is the tax rate on capital income (i.e., proﬁts), and τht is the tax rate on labor
income.
In their analysis of the U.S. Great Depression, Cole and Ohanian (1999) conclude
that plausible estimates of the increase in the tax rates τpt and τht are not large enough to
have much of an eﬀect. They use estimates of Joines (1981) and compare the deterministic
steady state of the model with 1929 tax rates to the deterministic steady state of the model
with 1939 tax rates. In 1929, Joines’ estimates of the tax rates on capital and labor are
29.5 and 3.5 percent, respectively. In 1939, Joines’ estimates of the tax rates on capital
and labor are 42.6 and 8.3 percent, respectively.
Like Cole and Ohanian (1999) and others in the business cycle literature, I use the tax
rates on capital and labor estimated by Joines (1981)—namely his MTRK1 and MTRL1—
as inputs for τpt and τht, along with a measure of detrended real government spending taken
from the U.S. national accounts. (See Table A.1 and Appendix A for details.) For the
6quantitative results that I report below, I assume that households had full knowledge of
the path of spending and tax rates, but this assumption is not critical for the ﬁndings. (In
a separate appendix, I vary assumptions about household expectations and show that it
hardly aﬀects the results.)
For my simulation, I use a ﬂow utility function given by
U (c,h) = log(c) + ψ log(1 − h)
and parameters that imply aggregate quantities consistent with the U.S. data in 1929,
namely, ψ = 1.92, δ = 0.03, β = 0.97, γ = .02, η = .01, and θ = .45.
In Figures 1–4, I plot the model’s predictions for detrended real investment, detrended
real GDP, and per capita hours. To detrend investment and GDP, I divide the series by
population and growth in labor-augmenting technical change (that is, (1+γ)t). The series
are compared to U.S. time series that are detrended in the same way. The series are
indexed so that 1929 equals 100.
As expected, the diﬀerences between the model’s predictions and the U.S. time series
are large. Between 1929 and 1932, investment falls by 70 percent in the United States but
by only 21 percent in the model. The model predicts a 4 percent decline in per capita
hours between 1929 and 1932, but the actual decline was 27 percent. For GDP, the model
predicts a 3 percent decline between 1929 and 1932, but the actual decline was 31 percent.
In 1939, U.S. hours are 21 percent below trend, whereas U.S. GDP is 18 percent below
trend; the model predicts 8 percent and 6 percent, respectively.
3. A Model Motivated by U.S. Policy
I now extend the basic growth model analyzed by Cole and Ohanian (1999) to include
taxes on property, capital stock, excess proﬁts, undistributed proﬁts, dividends, and sales
7in addition to taxes on wages and ordinary proﬁts.5 I also allow for investment in both
tangible and intangible capital; both stocks were large, but the tax treatment was diﬀerent
and motivated shifts between them to avoid taxation. With these additions, I reexamine
the impact of ﬁscal policy in the 1930s and ﬁnd that it had a large impact on economic
activity, especially investment and equity values, although it cannot be the only factor in
accounting for the large contraction and slow recovery.
At the beginning of the 1930s, the source of most government revenues was indirect
business taxes on property, sales, and excise. Over the decade, as deﬁcits grew at all
levels of government, legislators increased tax rates, especially those on individual and
corporate incomes and sales and excise. Although the tax revenues on incomes never
exceeded indirect business taxes, they did directly impact almost all capital owners in the
United States and do play an important role in the quantitative results below. The most
important are higher taxes on dividends paid by individual shareholders and higher taxes
on undistributed proﬁts paid by corporations.
In order to accurately assess the impact of these taxes on capital income, it is im-
portant to take into account the fact that a signiﬁcant amount of capital investment was
expensed and thus nontaxable; these include investments in advertising, R&D, and organi-
zational capital, which I collectively term intangible investments. With taxes rising, “many
manufacturers have concluded that it will be better business judgment to spend money for
business promotion, advertising, newspaper campaigns, technical research, etc., in which
they get full beneﬁt of each dollar in building up business” (New York Times, July 23,
1936, citing Dr. Caldwell, trustee of the Museum of Science and Industry). This shift from
tangible to intangible investments is also evident in statistics on R&D employment. For
example, Mowery and Rosenberg (1989) report that employment of scientists and engineers
in two-digit manufacturing industries nearly tripled, rising from 10,927 to 27,777 between
5 Brown (1949) shows that, when used in combination, the capital stock tax and the excess proﬁts tax
acted like a tax on corporate proﬁts, which is how I will model them.
81933 and 1940, and the number of scientiﬁc personnel per 1,000 wage earners doubled,
rising from 1.93 in 1933 to 3.67 in 1940.
Next, I turn to a description of the extended model with additional taxes and intan-
gible capital included.
3.1. Theory





























Firms produce ﬁnal output y using their intangible capital kI, tangible capital k1
T, and labor
h1. Firms produce intangible capital xI—such as new brands, R&D, patents, etc.—using
intangible capital kI, tangible capital k2
T, and labor h2.
Note that kI is an input to both sectors; it is not split between them, as is the case
for tangible capital and labor. A brand name is used both to sell ﬁnal goods and services
and to develop new brands. Patents are used by the producers and the researchers. (See
McGrattan and Prescott (2010) for the aggregation theory underlying this technology.)




βt [logct + ψ log(1 − ht)]Nt
subject to
ct + xTt + qtxIt = rTtkTt + rItkIt + wtht + κt − ζt
kT,t+1 = [(1 − δT)kTt + xTt]/(1 + η) (3.3)
kI,t+1 = [(1 − δI)kIt + xIt]/(1 + η) (3.4)
9and nonnegativity constraints on investment, xTt ≥ 0 and xIt ≥ 0. As before, all variables
are in per capita units, and there is growth in population at rate η. The relative price of
intangible investment and consumption is q. The rental rates for tangible and intangible
capital are denoted by rT and rI, respectively, and the wage rate for labor is denoted by
w. As before, inputs are paid their marginal products.
Since capital taxation studied here aﬀects only business activity, I assume that non-
business output yn less investment xn is (exogenously) included with transfers to house-
holds κt. I also assume that hours ht include hours in nonbusiness production, hn. (See
the time paths of nonbusiness activity in Appendix A, Table A.1.)
Gross domestic product is the sum of private consumption, tangible investment, public
consumption, and nonbusiness investment xn; in per capita terms, GDP is c+xT +g+xn.
Gross domestic income (GDI) is the sum of labor income wh and capital income less
expensed investment, rTkT+ rIkI− qxI, and nonbusiness capital income yn − whn.
3.2. U.S. Tax Policy
Next, I modify the way taxes are modeled and rerun the numerical experiment done for
the basic growth model. Speciﬁcally, I include three additional taxes on capital income—
dividends, property, and undistributed proﬁts—as well as taxes on consumption. In this
case, the speciﬁc formula for ζt is given by
ζt = τctct + τhtwtht + τktkTt + τut (kT,t+1 − kTt)
+ τpt{rTtkTt + rItkIt − δTkTt − qtxIt − τktkTt}
+ τdt{rTtkTt + rItkIt − xTt − qtxIt − τktkTt − τut (kT,t+1 − kTt)
− τpt (rTtkTt + rItkIt − δTkTt − qtxIt − τktkTt)}, (3.5)
where τkt is the tax rate on property, τpt is the tax rate on proﬁts, τdt is the tax rate on
dividends, τut is the tax rate on undistributed proﬁts, τct is the tax rate on consumption,
10and τht is the tax rate on labor income. Note that taxable income for the tax on proﬁts
is net of depreciation and property tax, and taxable income for the tax on distributions is
net of taxes on proﬁts, property, and undistributed proﬁts.
In Appendix A, I describe in detail my estimates of U.S. spending and tax rates used
as inputs in the numerical experiments. Here, I brieﬂy describe the sources of the estimates
used.
For government spending and the tax rate on wages, I use the same inputs as in the
standard model. (See Table A.2.) Table A.3 shows the additional taxes used in simulating
the extended model, namely, time series for τpt, τdt, τkt, and τct.6
The tax rate on proﬁts used in the standard model is now replaced by an estimate
of the tax rate on business proﬁts plus an estimate of the eﬀective rate due to the capital
stock tax in combination with the excess proﬁts tax. For the normal business proﬁts, I use
the statutory corporate income tax rate.
The tax on capital stock and excess proﬁts was in eﬀect in 1933 and subsequent
years and, according to Brown (1949), was eﬀectively a tax on proﬁts. Companies had
to declare a value for their capital stock, and a tax was assessed on that value. To avoid
having companies declare a capital value that was too low, the government used an excess
proﬁts tax as a penalty. For example, in 1934, if proﬁts exceeded 12.5 percent of the
declared capital stock value, they paid a 5 percent tax on the excess proﬁts. To avoid this
penalty, companies tended to declare a high value for capital and paid roughly 2 percent
of proﬁts because of this tax in addition to their normal tax bill. (See Brown (1949).) For
this reason, the tax rate listed in Table A.3 is an estimate of the normal tax on proﬁts
plus an additional 2 percent that is indirectly assessed through the capital stock tax.
6 For the extended model, household expectations are modeled as a probability distribution over ob-
served spending and tax rates for the years 1930–1939. Given they are the basis of expectations, I
ﬁlter the actual series and use only the low frequencies. See Appendix A for more details.
11The most important tax for the quantitative results turns out to be τdt (column 2
of Table A.2), which is estimated as the average marginal tax rate on U.S. dividends. In
Figure A.1, I plot the time series of this tax rate for the period 1913–2000. Figure A.2
shows this tax rate over the period 1929–1939, along with the surtax rate for the highest
income bracket. The surtax rates are relevant for the calculation of marginal tax rates
on dividend income. The plot shows that the eﬀective rates used in simulating the model
equilibrium are well below the highest surtax rates.
Also included in the analysis are taxes on property and consumption, which yielded
the bulk of government revenues during the 1930s. These are shown in the last two columns
of Table A.3. Estimates of these rates are constructed from NIPA taxes on imports and
production.
For the tax on undistributed proﬁts, τut, which was in eﬀect for the years 1936–1938,
I use an eﬀective rate of 5 percent. This estimate yields revenues that are in line with
revenues reported in the Statistics of Income. (See Appendix A for more details.)
In the model, as in the United States, the treatment of tangible and intangible income
diﬀers. This can be seen from the formula (3.5). Taxes on property and undistributed
proﬁts are levied on tangible capital and tangible net investment. For the purposes of tax-
ation of proﬁts, tangible capital is not expensed but intangible capital is. The asymmetric
treatment also aﬀects the incidence of the tax on dividends.
3.3. Expectations
When analyzing the standard model, I assumed that households had perfect foresight
about the future paths of spending and tax rates. Even with this extreme assumption
about expectations, the impact of ﬁscal policies was too small to justify inclusion in any
analysis of the Great Depression era. In the extended model, with taxes on many diﬀerent
sources of capital income, expectations will play a more signiﬁcant role. Here, I motivate
12the parameterization used in the benchmark simulations and then later show how the
predicted time series change as I change assumptions about household expectations.
Table 2 summarizes the benchmark parameterization of the process governing ﬁscal
policy. The table is a transition matrix with the current state, call it st, taking on values
listed in the rows of the table and the future state listed in the columns. In other words,
the states are the years 1929 through 1939. A current state of “1930” means that ﬁscal
policy in this state is the same as it was in the United States in 1930. It is assumed that
spending and tax rates are functions of st, for example, τdt = τd(st), and the functions
are read oﬀ Tables A.2 and A.3. Notice that most transitional probabilities in Table 2 are
zero (and therefore not printed). Transiting from the 1930 state, the only possible states
for 1931 are ﬁscal policies equivalent to U.S. policies observed in 1929, 1930, and 1931.
Households are assumed to put 1/3 weight on each of those future states.
The parameterization in Table 2 assumes that there is uncertainty in 1930–1931 and
again in 1936–1937. The initial uncertainty about tax and spending policies does not get
fully resolved until the U.S. Revenue Act of 1932 is enacted. Prior to that time, households
are warned that spending bills in Congress cannot be ﬁnanced out of current revenue
streams. Headlines like “Hoover Warns Congress to Economize or be Faced by Tax Rise
of 40 Percent” (New York Times, February 25, 1930) can be found throughout newspaper
archives in 1930 and 1931. However, households are uncertain about the speciﬁcs of the
ﬁnal bill until 1932. At that point, they know that the revenue bill calls for large increases
in marginal income tax rates on individuals.
Each subsequent year, a new revenue act was introduced. In 1933, the tax on capital
stock and excess proﬁts was introduced (via the National Industrial Recovery Act). In
1934, the main changes in policy were designed to prevent tax avoidance. In 1935, there
were increases in surtaxes on individuals. The main change in 1936 was the introduction of
the undistributed proﬁts tax. This was likely to have been a surprise to most Americans,
13Next Period’s Policy Like That of:




























Table 2. Transition Matrix for Benchmark Model Simulation
given that President Roosevelt did not propose this tax until a speech given in March of
1936. Congress went along with the proposal, and the law was passed soon thereafter and
applicable to income during the entire calendar year. In modeling expectations, I have
chosen parameters in the transition matrix of Table 2 consistent with the 1936 law being
a completely unanticipated change. After that, there is uncertainty about the permanence
of the undistributed proﬁts tax, which is modeled as a 1/2, 1/2 probability on staying with
the same policy (1936) or transiting to the next year (1937). This is done for 1937 as well
since there was uncertainty about whether it would continue. In 1938, it was clear that
the undistributed proﬁts tax would be eliminated.
3.4. Model Predictions
In this section, I report on simulations of the model economy.
14As before, I assume that the utility function is logarithmic and growth rates are
given by γ = .02 and η = .01. Nonbusiness activities are set exogenously to be equal
to U.S. levels. As noted earlier, the (detrended) paths of hours, investment, and output
are shown in Table A.1. The remaining parameters are set so that aggregates in the
model economy are equal to their U.S. analogues in 1929. This implies parameter values
of ψ = 2.1, β = .98, δT = .035, θ = .24, and φ = .11. The only parameter that cannot be
set in this way is δI because the intangible depreciation rate and the share of intangible
capital in production φ cannot be separately identiﬁed. Without loss of generality, then, I
set δI = 0.
Figures 5–8 show predictions of the extended model for investment, hours, GDP, and
consumption, which are comparable to Figures 1–4 for the standard model. A comparison
of Figures 1 and 5 shows that disaggregating the capital tax rates makes a big diﬀerence
for the model’s prediction of measured investment (which is the sum of tangible invest-
ment and nonbusiness investment). With the Joines’ tax rate on proﬁts only, investment
declines very gradually. With diﬀerent rates on proﬁts, dividends, and property, the model
predicts an immediate and sharp fall in investment. The primary determinant for the fall
is expectations about the future changes in the tax rate on dividends. In fact, with τpt
and τkt set equal and ﬁxed to 1929 levels, the picture changes little. The reason for the
large decline is that households anticipate large changes in the eﬀective return to capital.
To see this, consider the households’ intertemporal ﬁrst-order condition for tangible
capital in the case that nonnegativity constraints are not binding on investment:
(1 + τut)(1 − τdt)
(1 + τct)ˆ ct
= ˆ βE
h (1 − τdt+1)
(1 + τct+1)ˆ ct+1
· {(1 − τpt+1)(rTt+1 − δT − τkt+1) + 1 + τut+1}
i
, (3.6)
where ˆ β = β/(1 + γ) and variables with hats are detrended by population and growth
15in technology, (1 + γ)t.7 If tax rates on dividends are constant, then the terms 1 − τdt
and 1 − τdt+1 cancel. In this case, taxes on dividends have no eﬀect if revenues are lump-
sum rebated to households, because their budget sets do not change and their ﬁrst-order
conditions do not change. Similarly, if households have myopic expectations—by which I
mean that every period they think the current tax rates they are facing will be in place
forever—then tax rates on dividends have no eﬀect even if they do change in reality. On
the other hand, if households put some probability on changing rates, then the terms 1−τdt
and 1−τdt+1 do not cancel and the eﬀective rate of return to capital is aﬀected. With tax
rates rising, eﬀective rates of return are falling.
Figure 6 shows hours per capita for the model and the U.S. data. The pattern for
the model is similar to the pattern of investment. Hours fall about 13 percent between
1929 and 1933 in the model and about 27 percent in the United States. They recover
subsequently in the model and by 1939 are roughly 4 percent below trend. In the data,
hours are still well below trend—about 20 percentage points—by 1939. Thus, although
the predictions in 1939 are similar to the standard model (Figure 2), the relative declines
in the ﬁrst part of the decade are signiﬁcantly larger in the extended model. Overall, the
results show that the impact of taxation is nontrivial, especially in the ﬁrst half of the
1930s and in the 1937–1938 recession.
Figure 7 shows model GDP declines about as much as hours of work between 1929
and 1933. The predicted fall is about 40 percent of the actual decline in U.S. GDP. It
is not greater in the model because households consume more as more capital income
is distributed to households. In the United States, both consumption and investment
declined, implying a larger decline in U.S. GDP.
Figure 8 shows the model’s consumption path which is rising prior to 1932, whereas it
fell continually between 1929 and 1933. The optimal response to high future capital taxes
7 Intuition for the actual simulation is complicated by the fact that negativity constraints do bind in
many states of the world.
16is high current distributions of business income. Taxes on consumption do rise during the
1930s but not signiﬁcantly until after 1932. The large deviation between theory and data
cannot be resolved by introducing the type of ﬁnancial frictions proposed by Bernanke
and Gertler (1989).8 Taxes on dividends have the same impact on economic activity as
the agency costs in their model. Both impact the price of capital, leading to declines
in investment and increases in consumption. In the model studied here, there is another
channel for spending, namely intangible investment, but its price is also aﬀected negatively
by expected increases in the tax rate on dividends.
Figure 9 shows the patterns of both tangible and intangible investment. Notice that
initially, both series fall as distributions are increased. The series are less correlated in the
latter part of the decade when the rate on corporate proﬁts increases and the undistributed
proﬁts tax is introduced. To see why, consider the (unconstrained) ﬁrst-order condition
for intangible capital:
qt [(1 − τpt)(1 − τdt)]
(1 + τct)ˆ ct
= ˆ βE
h(1 − τpt+1)(1 − τdt+1)
(1 + τct+1)ˆ ct+1
{rIt+1 + qt+1 (1 − δI)}
i
. (3.7)
The expected return in (3.6) is diﬀerent because the tax treatment is diﬀerent. Intangible
is expensed from the proﬁts tax τp and is not aﬀected by the undistributed proﬁts tax.
Another important consequence of the increase in tax rates on dividends is the decline
in equity values. In Figure 10, I show the time series for the (detrended) real equity value,
which in this case is equal to
Vt = (1 − τdt)[(1 + τut)KTt+1 + (1 − τpt)qtKIt+1],
where KTt+1 and KIt+1 are aggregate end-of-year capital tangible and intangible capital
stocks, respectively. Prior to the introduction of the undistributed proﬁts tax, the price
8 The patterns of model investment and consumption are close to those found by Chari, Kehoe, and
McGrattan (2007) in an experiment where they choose the investment wedge to exactly ﬁt the pattern
of investment. The point was to show that this wedge alone cannot account for ﬂuctuations during
the 1930s.
17of tangible capital is one minus the tax rate on dividends. A rise in the tax rate from 10
percent to 30 percent implies a 22 percent decline in the price of capital. If the tax proceeds
are rebated to households, then the government becomes a shareholder owning 22 percent
of the business and the capital stock is not permanently changed. For shareholders facing
the highest surtax rate (75 percent), the impact on their equity values would be large.
3.5. Sensitivity Analysis
In this section, I discuss the sensitivity of the results to the choice of the transition matrix
governing household expectations. (See Table 2.)
Figure 11 shows the model’s predictions of tangible investment for three diﬀerent
choices of household expectations. Recall that the benchmark is based on the transition
matrix in Table 2. The series marked “Myopic, 1930–1931” assumes that households put
100 percent probability in 1930 of staying with 1930 policy and similarly for 1931. The
transition matrix for 1932 and after is the same as in Table 2. The series marked “Perfect
Foresight, 1930–1939” assumes that households have full knowledge of the path of spending
and tax rates.
If households place no probabilistic weight on the higher tax rates of the 1930s, as
is true in the myopic example, then tangible investment does not fall as much as in the
benchmark. However, there is still a ﬁrst-order eﬀect on investment, which is much larger
than the standard model prediction. If the households have perfect foresight, they react
immediately and sharply to the news by setting tangible investment to zero. It is not
shown, but intangible investment in this case also falls dramatically, close to 70 percent,
in the ﬁrst year.
Another interesting aspect of the perfect foresight case is the reaction to news about
the undistributed proﬁts tax. In the benchmark simulation, this tax is completely unan-
ticipated. In the perfect foresight case, it is completely anticipated. Thus, there is a sharp
18rise in tangible investment between 1931 and 1935 with a dramatic fall when the tax is in
eﬀect.
In summary, the main conclusion that capital taxation played an important role during
the Great Depression is not overturned as I vary assumptions about household expecta-
tions.
4. Conclusion
Many theories have been proposed for the large contraction of the 1930s and the slow
recovery. Absent in the theories of Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Bernanke and Gertler
(1989), Cole and Ohanian (2004), and many others is any role for ﬁscal policy. This paper
challenges the conventional view that ﬁscal policy played little or no role. Tax rates on
dividends rose signiﬁcantly during the decade and, when fed into the standard growth
model, imply a large drop in tangible and intangible investments and equity values. In
the later part of the 1930s, tax rates on undistributed proﬁts were introduced and led to
another dramatic decline in tangible investment.
Although the results show that tax policy had large eﬀects, it could not have been
the only factor in accounting for the Great Depression. Predicted consumption counter-
factually rises prior to 1932, with households anticipating some increases in income taxes
and sales taxes. This deviation is also evident in standard theories of ﬁnancial frictions
and remains a challenge for those interested in accounting for the dramatic contraction in
the early 1930s.
19Table A.1. Nonbusiness Activity in the Extended Modela
Year Hours Investment Output
1929 7.4 15.0 36.3
1930 7.3 12.3 34.1
1931 7.2 9.9 32.6
1932 7.1 7.8 31.2
1933 7.0 7.0 30.4
1934 7.1 7.6 30.3
1935 7.2 9.1 31.0
1936 7.2 10.6 31.9
1937 7.2 11.8 32.3
1938 7.1 12.5 32.5
1939 7.0 13.4 32.6
a The series for hours is the fraction of time spent in nonbusiness work. The series for investment and
output are detrended and normalized by U.S. GDP in 1929. See Appendix A for further details.
Appendix A.
The main source for the data used in this study is the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA), which publishes the national accounts and ﬁxed asset tables in the Survey of
Current Business (available online at www.bea.gov). In this appendix I provide details on
the data used and the necessary adjustments that are made to make the model accounts
consistent with the U.S. accounts.
A.1. National Accounts and Fixed Assets
The main components of GDP are found in Table 1.1.5 of the national income and product
accounts (NIPA) from the Survey of Current Business of the Department of Commerce
(1929–2010). GDP in the business sector is set equal to value added of corporations and
nonfarm proprietorships. All components of GDP are deﬂated by the GDP deﬂator (in
Table 1.1.9) and population at midperiod (Table 2.1).
A.1.1. Components of GDP
20Consumption is deﬁned to be personal consumption expenditures on nondurables and ser-
vices, adjusted to include consumer durable services and leave out sales tax. (Details of
these adjustments are described below.) Investment is deﬁned to be the sum of gross pri-
vate domestic investment, government investment, net exports, and personal consumption
expenditures on durables after subtracting sales taxes. Business tangible investment is
deﬁned to be the part of investment made by corporations and nonfarm proprietors. Non-
business investment is residually deﬁned as investment less business tangible investment.
Government spending is deﬁned to be government consumption expenditures. (The real
per capita nonbusiness investment and value added, which are divided by 1.02t, are dis-
played in Table A.1. The real per capita government spending series, which is also divided
by 1.02t, is displayed in Table A.2. These are inputs in the numerical experiments.)
A.1.2. Adjustments to Accounts
Two adjustments are made to GDP and its components to make them consistent with
the model accounts: sales taxes are subtracted and services for consumer durables and
government capital are added.
Sales Taxes. Unlike the NIPA, the model output does not include consumption taxes
as part of consumption and as part of value added. I therefore subtract sales and ex-
cise taxes from the NIPA data on taxes on production and imports and from personal
consumption expenditures, since these taxes primarily aﬀect consumption expenditures.
Fixed Asset Expenditures. I treat expenditures on all ﬁxed assets as investment.
Thus, spending on consumer durables is treated as an investment rather than as a con-
sumption expenditure and moved from the consumption category to the investment cate-
gory. The consumer durables services sector is introduced in the same way as the NIPA
introduces owner-occupied housing services. Households rent the consumer durables to
themselves. Speciﬁcally, I add depreciation of consumer durables to consumption of ﬁxed
capital of households and to private consumption . I add imputed additional capital ser-
vices for consumer durables to capital income and to private consumption. I assume a
rate of return equal to 4.1 percent, which is an estimate of the return on other types
of capital. A related adjustment is made for government capital. Speciﬁcally, I add im-
puted additional capital services for government capital to capital income and to public
consumption.
21A.2. Hours Per Capita
The primary source of the hours series is Kendrick (1961), Table A-X, total manhours.
Nonbusiness hours are the sum of hours in the government and farm sectors. Business
hours are total hours less nonbusiness hours. For per capita hours, I divide the manhours
series by the population age 16 and over. The population series is Series A39 of the
Historical Statistics of the Department of Commerce (1975).
A.3. Market Value
The total market value of U.S. corporations is available from the Flow of Funds starting
in 1945. Prior to that time, there is only information about subsets of stocks. Here, I use
the market value of companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), available
in the Survey of Current Business: Annual Supplements (1932–2000). As McGrattan and
Prescott (2004) show, ﬂuctuations in the total market value and the NYSE market value
track each other closely in the post-1945 period. (See, in particular, their Figure 2.)
A.4. Tax Rates
To compute an equilibrium in the standard model (Section 2), I use estimates of marginal
tax rates on capital and labor from Joines (1981), speciﬁcally MTRK1 and MTRL1 shown
in Table A.1 (along with the government spending series deﬁned above).
In the second series of numerical exercises (Figures 5–11), I use the Joines (1981)
MTRL1 for the tax on labor income, but I do not use MTRK1 for capital income. Instead,
I include diﬀerent rates for proﬁts, dividends, and property. These rates are reported in
Table A.3. The proﬁts tax is the statutory rate reported in the IRS’s Statistics of Income,
smoothed so that it is not simply a step function. (The smoothing algorithm is described
below.) The source of the dividend tax is McGrattan and Prescott (2003), who compute
an average weighted marginal tax rate. In other words, a tax rate on dividend income
is computed using data for each income group from the IRS’s Statistics of Income. A
weighted average is computed using the fraction of dividend income per income group as
the weighting factor. The time series for the period 1913–2000 is shown in Figure A.1. In
Figure A.2, I show the rate for 1929–1939, along with the smoothed rate I use in computer
simulations and the tax rate for the highest dividend income bracket.
22Table A.2. Spending and Tax Rates in the Standard Model
Detrended Tax Rates on
Government
Year Spending Wages Proﬁts
1929 5.8 3.5 29.5
1930 6.1 3.6 27.8
1931 6.7 3.8 28.6
1932 7.1 4.9 33.1
1933 7.2 6.8 41.1
1934 7.8 7.5 41.0
1935 7.7 7.4 41.4
1936 8.2 8.0 46.2
1937 7.7 8.1 44.4
1938 8.2 8.3 41.4
1939 8.7 8.3 42.6
Table A.3. Additional Tax Rates in the Extended Model
Tax Rates on
Year Proﬁtsa Dividends Property Consumption
1929 11.1 9.1 1.4 2.7
1930 11.8 9.6 1.6 3.0
1931 12.5 11.5 1.7 3.6
1932 13.2 15.6 1.8 4.5
1933 15.6 19.2 1.8 5.6
1934 15.7 22.8 1.8 6.6
1935 16.0 26.0 1.7 7.0
1936 16.7 28.7 1.7 7.1
1937 17.9 28.2 1.7 7.1
1938 19.9 26.8 1.6 7.2
1939 22.2 27.3 1.6 7.3
a This rate replaces the rate in Table A.2 and includes taxes on proﬁts, capital stock, and excess proﬁts.
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Figure A.2. Average Marginal Tax Rate on U.S. Dividends
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24In the last two columns of Table A.3 are property and consumption tax rates con-
structed from NIPA data on taxes on production and imports. To construct a rate for the
property tax, I divide the property tax revenues for corporations and nonfarm proprietors
by the sum of the capital stocks of corporations and nonfarm proprietors. To construct a
rate for the tax on consumption, I divide the sales and excise tax revenues by the measure
of consumption deﬁned above.
All series in Table A.3 have been ﬁltered using the algorithm proposed by Hodrick and
Prescott (1997) with the value of their smoothing parameter (λ) equal to 1. An example
of the smoothed series and the original series is shown in Figure A.2 for the tax rate on
dividends.
The capital stock tax and excess proﬁts tax are treated in combination like a tax
on business proﬁts, as suggested by Brown (1949). In Table A.3, 2 percentage points
have been added to the smoothed statutory proﬁts tax in the years 1933–1939. Finally,
the undistributed proﬁts tax is set equal to 5 percent in the years 1936 through 1938.
This rate implies a ratio of revenues for the undistributed proﬁts tax relative to the total
corporate proﬁts taxes in the model that is roughly equal to the ratios reported in the
Statistics of Income.
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Figure 1. Detrended Real Investment in the United States






















Figure 2. Hours Per Capita in the United States and the























Figure 3. Detrended Real GDP in the United States























Figure 4. Detrended Real Consumption in the United States























Figure 5. Detrended Real Investment in the United States






















Figure 6. Hours Per Capita in the United States and the























Figure 7. Detrended Real GDP in the United States and the























Figure 8. Detrended Real Consumption in the United States























Figure 9. Detrended Real Tangible and Intangible Investment






















Figure 10. Detrended Real Market Value of the New York Stock Exchange



























Figure 11. Detrended Real Tangible and Intangible Investment
in the Model with Intangible Capital, 1929–1939
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